‘‘What does this mean?’’ How Web-based consumer health information fails to support information seeking in the pursuit of informed consent for screening test decisions by Burkell, Jacquelyn A & Campbell, D Grant
Western University
Scholarship@Western
FIMS Publications Information & Media Studies (FIMS) Faculty
2005
‘‘What does this mean?’’ How Web-based
consumer health information fails to support
information seeking in the pursuit of informed
consent for screening test decisions
Jacquelyn A. Burkell
Faculty of Information and Media Studies, Western University, jburkell@uwo.ca
D Grant Campbell
Western University
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fimspub
Part of the Library and Information Science Commons
Citation of this paper:
Burkell, J.A. and Campbell, D.G. (2005). “What Does This Mean?” How Web-Based Consumer Health Information Fails to Support
Information Seeking in the Pursuit of Informed Consent for Screening Test Decisions. Journal of the Medical Library Association.
93(3), 363-373.
200 J Med Libr Assoc 92(2) April 2004
What are the chances? Evaluating risk and benefit
information in consumer health materials
By Jacquelyn Burkell, PhD
jburkell@uwo.ca
Assistant Professor
Faculty of Information and Media Studies
Middlesex College
University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario
N6K 2C8 Canada
Much consumer health information addresses issues of disease risk or
treatment risks and benefits, addressing questions such as ‘‘How
effective is this treatment?’’ or ‘‘What is the likelihood that this test will
give a false positive result?’’ Insofar as it addresses outcome likelihood,
this information is essentially quantitative in nature, which is of critical
importance, because quantitative information tends to be difficult to
understand and therefore inaccessible to consumers. Information
professionals typically examine reading level to determine the
accessibility of consumer health information, but this measure does not
adequately reflect the difficulty of quantitative information, including
materials addressing issues of risk and benefit. As a result, different
methods must be used to evaluate this type of consumer health
material. There are no standard guidelines or assessment tools for this
task, but research in cognitive psychology provides insight into the best
ways to present risk and benefit information to promote understanding
and minimize interpretation bias. This paper offers an interdisciplinary
bridge that brings these results to the attention of information
professionals, who can then use them to evaluate consumer health
materials addressing risks and benefits.
INTRODUCTION
Information professionals working in the area of con-
sumer health information are careful to select the best
possible resources: those that are accurate, unbiased,
and appropriate for the intended audience [1]. One im-
portant concern is accessibility: can readers under-
stand and use the information? The most common
measure of accessibility is reading level, and material
written at a reading level of grade eight or lower is
held to be appropriate for the general public [2]. This
evaluation criterion is useful for consumer health ma-
terial that is primarily textual in nature, but it is less
appropriate for other types of information, including
quantitative information and information organized in
tables or figures rather than text [3].
Much consumer health information addresses ques-
tions of disease risk or treatment risks and benefits,
providing information regarding questions such as
‘‘What is the chance that I have West Nile virus?’’ or
‘‘Should I opt for surgery alone or surgery and radi-
ation in the treatment of my cancer?’’ Relevant infor-
mation includes, for example, the proportion of people
who have contracted West Nile virus or the survival
rates for cancer patients treated with surgery com-
pared to surgery plus radiation. This information is
essentially quantitative in nature in that it involves the
concept of outcome likelihood (e.g., 1 in 500 people
have a given infection, or the survival rate is 95%). As
a result, reading level does not adequately reflect ac-
cessibility, and, to evaluate resources that communicate
benefit and risk, other assessment criteria are required.
Research in cognitive psychology provides an ex-
cellent, if somewhat unexpected, source for these cri-
teria. Cognitive psychology is the study of human in-
formation processing, and empirical research in the
discipline examines the interaction of people with in-
formation. This body of research has been effectively
mined to identify general principles for information
presentation [4] and principles for the design of infor-
mation graphics [5]. This paper extends this approach
to the development of principles for the presentation
of information regarding risks and benefits. Armed
with these principles, information professionals can
identify (and possibly design [6]) optimal presenta-
tions of risk and benefit information. Ultimately, the
goal is to identify communications that, to borrow a
phrase from Norman [7], ‘‘make us smart,’’ those that
present risk and benefit information in a format that
is designed to promote accurate and unbiased interpre-
tation.
Evaluating risk and benefit information
J Med Libr Assoc 92(2) April 2004 201
One does not have to look very far in consumer
health information to find examples of risk and benefit
communication, and the challenges for consumers in
understanding and interpreting this information are
immediately evident. Consider, for example, the fol-
lowing passage describing breast cancer risk factors:
Your chances of developing breast cancer increase as you get
older. The disease rarely affects women under 30 years of
age, while close to 80 percent of breast cancers occur in
women over age 50. At age 40, you have a 1 in 217 chance
of developing breast cancer. By age 85, your chance is 1 in
8. [8]
This information raises a broad range of questions,
some of which are not answered by the information
provided, and others of which involve complex cal-
culations and reformulation of the data. Is a risk of 1
in 8 higher than a risk of 1 in 217? If so, how much
higher? What does it mean to say the disease rarely
affects women under 30? What is the risk of breast
cancer in a woman 50 years old? Another example is
the following quote from a Website providing infor-
mation for teens about West Nile virus:
The good news is that, even in areas where mosquitoes are
more likely to be carrying the virus, it’s very unlikely that a
person will become sick from a mosquito bite. Only 1% of
the mosquitoes in a region affected by West Nile virus are
actually infected with the virus. And less than 1% of the
people who do become infected with West Nile virus be-
come severely ill. [9]
Faced with this information, typical readers would
have some degree of difficulty determining their risk
of becoming severely ill with West Nile virus, which
according to these statistics is 1 in 10,000 (or 0.0001 or
0.01%) if they are bitten by a mosquito in an affected
region.
Information about outcome likelihood is particularly
relevant to health care decisions. Those choosing be-
tween health care alternatives need to understand the
likelihood of both the negative outcomes (risks) and
the positive outcomes (benefits) associated with the
available options to make informed choices between
them. Thus, for example:
n Informed decisions about screening tests (e.g., de-
cisions about maternal serum screening) require at
minimum an understanding of the baseline risk of
having the condition, the probability of a false negative
test result, and the probability of a false positive test
result [10].
n Women making decisions about hormone replace-
ment therapy to treat menopausal symptoms must un-
derstand and weigh the reduced risk of osteoporosis,
cardiovascular disease, colorectal cancer, and Alzhei-
mer’s disease against the increased risk of breast can-
cer, myocardial infarction, cerebrovascular disease,
and thromboembolic disease [11].
n Men choosing among options for the treatment of
localized prostate cancer want to know the likelihood
of side effects associated with the treatment options
before making their decision [12].
n Participants in genetic counseling programs must
understand the risks associated with treatment and the
meaning of a positive test result to make informed
decisions about genetic testing [13].
Not surprisingly, empirical research indicates that
information about risks and benefits tends to be dif-
ficult to understand [14], at least in part because the
interpretation of this type of information requires sig-
nificant quantitative skill [15–17]. Quantitative literacy
is quite limited in the general public: the International
Literacy Survey [18] indicates that almost half of North
Americans lack what are considered the minimum
skills required to apply arithmetic operations to num-
bers embedded in printed materials. Fractions and
proportions (exactly the type of quantitative informa-
tion typically used to present risks and benefits) are
the types of numerical information that prove most
challenging for the average person [19]. Furthermore,
even highly educated people have difficulty perform-
ing the quantitative operations that are commonly re-
quired in the interpretation of likelihood (e.g., con-
verting from percentages to proportions and vice ver-
sa [20]), and experts fall prey to the same biases in
interpretation that affect lay people [21]. Thus, the un-
derstanding of information regarding risks and bene-
fits proves challenging for many, if not all, people.
Thus far, the news seems bad: communications
about risks and benefits are ubiquitous in consumer
health information, and people have trouble under-
standing and using these communications. So what
can an information professional do? Training consum-
ers of health information to make sense of medical
data is one approach [22–24], consistent with the gen-
eral principle of empowering consumers by support-
ing literacy initiatives [25]. Careful examination of the
relevant research in cognitive psychology offers anoth-
er, perhaps adjunct, method of addressing the issue.
This research indicates that the format in which like-
lihood is presented—verbal, numeric, or visual—influ-
ences understanding. The research also identifies those
other aspects of presentation that tend to produce bi-
ased interpretation of risk and benefit information.
Based on these results, it is possible to identify the
characteristics of ‘‘good’’ presentations of risks and
benefits that maximize understanding and minimize
bias.
Throughout this paper, one example will be used to
illustrate the concepts being discussed. Imagine a for-
ty-year-old woman, pregnant for the first time, coming
to you for information about maternal serum screen-
ing. Her primary focus is screening for Down syn-
drome, and she wants to be sure to make an informed
decision regarding whether to take the test. She is par-
ticularly concerned about the meaning of a positive
test result, because she knows that a positive result
(even a false positive) would cause her significant psy-
chological distress, and because she understands that
the tests commonly recommended to distinguish true
positive from false positive results (amniocentesis and
chorionic villus sampling) themselves carry a risk to
the child. Much of her required information regards
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outcome likelihood: her overall risk of having a child
with Down syndrome (approximately 1%), the likeli-
hood that a case of Down syndrome will be correctly
identified by the test (termed sensitivity, maternal se-
rum screening has a 90% sensitivity for Down syn-
drome, indicating that about 90% of cases will be cor-
rectly identified, while 10% while receive an incorrect
negative test result), the likelihood that correct nega-
tive test result will be returned when the fetus does
not have Down syndrome (termed specificity, maternal
serum screening for Down syndrome has a specificity
about 60%, indicating that about 60% of negative cases
are correctly identified, while 40% of negative cases
receive a false positive result), and the iatrogenic risk
of amniocentesis (about 1%) and chorionic villus sam-
pling (about 1%).
Verbal labels for likelihood
Likelihood is essentially a numerical concept; nonethe-
less, a wide variety of verbal terms are used to com-
municate the chance that an outcome will occur. One
obvious advantage to the use of verbal labels for like-
lihood is that compared to numerical representations,
verbal labels are generally viewed as easier to use and
more natural, perhaps because they consist of common
words that seem to be easily understood [26–28]. This
apparent advantage, however, hides a serious draw-
back: inconsistent interpretation. On a positive note,
verbal probability labels tend to be ordered consistently
[29], so that people generally agree that some verbal
labels imply lower likelihood (e.g., probabilities la-
belled as ‘‘extremely low’’ or ‘‘low’’), while others im-
ply higher likelihood (e.g., probabilities labelled as
‘‘high’’ or ‘‘very high’’). There is, however, no consen-
sus about the particular numerical figure that best rep-
resents a given verbal probability label [30, 31], and
each verbal label tends to correspond to a wide range
of numerical probabilities [32]. The numerical proba-
bilities assigned to verbal probability labels differ
across individuals (e.g., physicians and patients assign
different numerical probabilities to the same verbal
probability label [33]) and across context (e.g., with the
outcome that is being considered [34, 35] or with the
context in which the outcome occurs [36]). Thus, a
‘‘low’’ risk of complications may mean 10% to one per-
son and 2% to another, or a ‘‘high’’ risk of death may
be 1%, while a ‘‘high’’ risk of minor injury could imply
20%. Overall, the evidence suggests that while verbal
labels for likelihood are viewed as easy to use, their
interpretation is highly variable and dependent on the
specific context.
When communicating likelihood, information pro-
viders tend to prefer to use verbal labels, especially
when the exact probability of the outcome is unknown;
information users, by contrast, usually prefer that like-
lihood be presented in numerical terms [37, 38]. Verbal
labels are viewed as less precise than their numerical
counterparts [39], which no doubt explains the differ-
ent preferences for verbal versus numerical represen-
tations. Information providers choose verbal labels, be-
cause they are careful not to express more than they
know, while users prefer numerical representations,
because they want the most precise information they
can possibly get. Both communicators and those re-
ceiving the communication agree that verbal labels are
used to describe uncertain or vague probability esti-
mates. Verbal labels, therefore, serve a dual purpose in
communication: they indicate the general likelihood
that an outcome will occur (e.g., low, medium, high),
and they signal that there is some uncertainty about
the exact level of probability.
If you found a resource for your client that described
the likelihoods in verbal terms, it might read as fol-
lows:
Your overall likelihood of having a child with Down syn-
drome is high. If your baby actually has Down syndrome, it
is quite certain that the test results will detect the problem;
nonetheless, there is a small possibility that the problem will
not be detected by the test. If your baby does not have Down
syndrome, it is somewhat likely that the test result will be
negative; it is, however, possible that the test will be positive
even if the baby does not have Down syndrome. Amniocen-
tesis or chorionic villus sampling may be recommended as
further tests in the event of a positive test result; each of
these procedures carries a high risk of spontaneous abortion.
It is important to note that, in this passage, the
‘‘high’’ risks of Down syndrome, amniocentesis, and
chorionic villus sampling correspond to approximately
1%. The verbal label of ‘‘high’’ risk is chosen based on
Calman’s standardized verbal scale for risk [40]. Cal-
man developed his scale to communicate low-proba-
bility risks associated with unlikely events such as be-
ing struck by lightning or contracting a rare disease.
This scale, therefore, is not appropriate to communi-
cate the sensitivity (90%) and specificity (60%) of the
test. In fact, Calman’s scale does not even have labels
for probabilities in the range required. The verbal la-
bels used to describe sensitivity and specificity were
chosen on the basis of a study of the interpretation of
standard verbal risk terms [41], which suggests, for
example, that in general use the term ‘‘somewhat like-
ly’’ corresponds to a chance of approximately 60%.
Thus, the passage indicates that it is somewhat likely
that the test result will be negative if your baby does
not have Down syndrome.
This highlights one of the difficulties with verbal
labels: the fact that interpretation changes with con-
text. In general use, a 10% chance that an outcome
would occur would be termed a ‘‘small possibility’’
[42] or a ‘‘very low chance’’ [43], but, when verbal la-
bels are used to describe the likelihood of an uncom-
mon adverse (usually medical) event, it has been sug-
gested that risks of 1 in 100 (much lower than a 10%
chance) should be termed ‘‘high’’ [44]. This leads to
the counterintuitive situation where, in this passage,
the ‘‘high’’ risk of Down syndrome is actually ten
times less than the ‘‘small possibility’’ of a false neg-
ative result. There is no empirical evidence on whether
people are able to accurately interpret multiple verbal
labels for likelihood in a context where the outcome is
changing, but simple perusal of the passage above
Evaluating risk and benefit information
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suggests that interpretation might pose a significant
problem.
Verbal labels for likelihood are entirely appropriate
for the communication of single probabilities that are
vague or uncertain, that is, when the likelihood of an
outcome is not precisely known [45, 46]. Thus, during
the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
crisis, it was appropriate to describe the risk of con-
tracting this hitherto unknown disease on an airplane
as ‘‘low’’ [47]. This type of use takes advantage of the
positive qualities of verbal labels (ease of use and im-
plicit communication of uncertainty) without incurring
any of the costs of these labels incurred by their
‘‘vague’’ or indeterminate quality. When more than
one likelihood is communicated for the purposes of
combination or comparison (as in the Down syndrome
example above), verbal labels are inappropriate be-
cause of the variability in interpretation. This is par-
ticularly true when the outcomes described range
from very low-probability events (e.g., the possibility
of a birth defect) to relatively high-probability events
(e.g., the possibility of a positive test result).
Numerical representation of likelihood
One general conclusion arises from the research on
verbal probability labels: if precise information about
likelihood is available, the precision of a numerical rep-
resentation is appropriate. Of course, the alternative
also holds true: numerical representations of probabil-
ity should not be used if probability is vague or un-
certain. As Wallsten [48] argues, the use of numerical
probability to represent vague or unknown likelihood
results in an unwarranted assumption (on the part of
the decision maker) about the precision of the proba-
bility estimate. This is particularly important because
decision makers prefer options with precise probabil-
ities over those where likelihood is vaguely specified
[49] and, thus, tend to prefer options with likelihood
described numerically over those where less precise
verbal labels are used. Using a numerical representa-
tion, therefore, can bias the evaluation of an alternative
based on the (possibly incorrect) assumption that the
probability is precisely known. It is, of course, possible
to indicate uncertainty in a numerical probability by
specifying a range instead of a single value (e.g., be-
tween 10% and 40%) or by applying an adjective such
as ‘‘approximately’’ to a numerical probability esti-
mate (e.g., approximately 20%). However, little re-
search has been done on the implications of these strat-
egies for the interpretation of risk communications,
and it remains a question whether either or both of
these methods appropriately counteract the implied
precision of the numerical representation. For vague or
uncertain probabilities, therefore, numerical represen-
tations should be avoided, and, for probabilities that
can be precisely specified, numerical representations
are preferred.
Numerical representations of likelihood come in a
wide variety of forms. The most common of these are
single-event probability (e.g., 0.05), percent (e.g., 5%),
frequency (e.g., 5 in 100), and absolute frequency (e.g.,
600). The first three of these representations incorpo-
rate information about the likelihood of both occur-
rence and nonoccurrence (because the likelihood of
nonoccurrence is the inverse of each, 0.95, 95%, or 95
in 100 respectively). The last representation indicates
only the number of times the outcome occurs (or is
expected to occur) and does not offer any information
about nonoccurrences. In a direct comparison of these
formats, Brase [50] found that frequencies (e.g., 5 in
100, which he terms ‘‘simple frequencies’’) are per-
ceived as clearest and easiest to understand, followed
by percent format (e.g., 5%). Single-event probabilities
(e.g., 0.05) are perceived as the most difficult to un-
derstand. These data are consistent with studies of sta-
tistical reasoning, which indicate that frequency pre-
sentations facilitate understanding of data [51–53].
Thus, based both on perception and on actual perfor-
mance, frequency presentations of likelihood infor-
mation are better than other formats.
When the frequency format is used to present in-
formation about likelihood, there is evidence that the
interpretation is unduly influenced by the absolute
number of occurrences reported. Overall, when larger
numbers (higher frequency, larger reference group) are
used in frequency presentations, events are seen as
more likely [54]. Thus, death rates of 1,286 in 10,000
(probability of 0.1286) are incorrectly rated as more
risky than rates of 24.14 in 100 (probability of 0.2414)
[55], and subjects demonstrate an objectively irrational
preference for a 9 out of 100 (probability of 0.09)
chance of winning a small lottery over a 1 out of 10
(probability of 0.1) chance [56]. In the interpretation of
these expressions of likelihood, it seems that the focus
is first on the absolute number of occurrences, fol-
lowed by an insufficient correction for the size of the
reference or comparison group, consistent with the
‘‘anchoring an adjustment’’ cognitive bias identified by
Kahneman and Tversky [57]. A general principle that
arises in other contexts plays a role here: intuition tells
us that larger numbers represent larger probabilities.
This rule is entirely applicable for probabilities ex-
pressed as decimals or percent and holds for frequen-
cies when they are expressed as counts over a group
of standard size. It is, however, invalid when compar-
ing frequencies occurring within references groups of
different sizes. The rule seems to be applied by default
or, at least, appears to have by default some influence
on the subjective likelihood associated with a given
explicit probability. Therefore, when likelihoods to be
compared are expressed as frequency counts, they
should be presented as occurrences counted over
groups of a standard size, as opposed to a standard
number of occurrences over groups of shifting size [58,
59]. Thus, comparisons between two likelihoods will
be more accurate if they are presented as 5 out of 100
versus 25 out of 100, rather than the formally equiva-
lent representation of 1 out of 20 versus 1 out of 4.
The advantage of frequency over probability repre-
sentations is most pronounced in probabilistic reason-
ing tasks that prove difficult for lay people [60, 61] and
experts [62, 63] alike. In the context of consumer health
Burkell
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information, the most common of these reasoning
tasks is determining the predictive value of a symptom
or screening test result. The positive predictive value
(PPV) is the likelihood that a person actually has the
condition given the presence of a symptom or a pos-
itive screening test result; the negative predictive value
(NPV) is the likelihood that the person does not have
the condition given the absence of the symptom or a
negative test result. It is important that health care
consumers understand the predictive value of symp-
toms and tests both for decision support and to help
manage anxiety related to health and health care.
The predictive value of a symptom or test result is
determined jointly by three factors: sensitivity (the
probability that the test is positive or the symptom is
present given that the person has the condition), spec-
ificity (the probability that the symptom is absent or
the test result is negative given that the person does
not have the condition), and the base rate of the con-
dition (the proportion of people in the population who
have the condition). When the relevant information is
presented as either single-event probabilities (e.g.,
0.05) or percents (e.g., 5%), the vast majority of experts
and lay people strongly overestimate predictive value;
when the same information is presented as frequen-
cies, correct responding is much higher [64–66]. Using
our example, the effect of format is immediately ob-
vious. Here is the presentation of the relevant infor-
mation in probability format:
The likelihood that a 40-year-old woman will have a child
with Down syndrome is approximately 0.01. If your baby
has Down syndrome, the likelihood that the test will detect
the condition is 0.9, and the likelihood that the condition will
not be detected by the test is 0.1. If your baby does not have
Down syndrome, the likelihood that the test will be negative
is 0.6, but there is a 0.4 likelihood that the test will be pos-
itive even if your baby does not have Down syndrome.
Compare this to the information presented in fre-
quency format:
Of 1,000 pregnant women who are 40 years of age, 10 will
have children with Down syndrome. If all 1,000 women were
tested, 9 of the women with Down syndrome babies would
test positive for the condition, and 1 would test negative. Of
the 990 women whose babies do not have Down syndrome,
394 would test positive, and 596 would have test negative.
Given the first presentation, most people would
guess that a positive test result would indicate a rel-
atively high probability that the fetus has Down syn-
drome, on the order of 75%. However, when the in-
formation is presented as frequencies (as in the second
example), it is immediately obvious that a positive test
result carries much less diagnostic certainty: it is easy
to see that a total of 403 positive test results are ex-
pected (9 true positive plus 394 false positive), and, of
these, only 9 (slightly over 2%) are true positive re-
sults. Frequency format assists decision makers in
making the correct interpretation; in contrast, presen-
tation as probabilities or percents makes it difficult to
determine predictive value.
It is important to note that, for the purposes of cal-
culating predictive value, not all frequency represen-
tations are equal. To support this type of reasoning,
the data must be presented in ‘‘natural frequency’’ for-
mat [67]. Natural frequencies are simply counts over a
group of standard size; in the example above, all fre-
quencies are expressed as incidents in the group of
1,000. A mathematically equivalent presentation of the
same information could use different group sizes (e.g.,
0.9 out of 100 test positive and have the condition; 1
of 1,000 tests negative and has the condition; 197 of
500 test positive and do not have the condition; 149 of
250 test negative and do not have the condition), but
the representation no longer facilitates the correct in-
terpretation. It becomes difficult to determine the pre-
dictive value with this presentation. Therefore, the two
reasons to hold the size of the group standard when
presenting frequencies are to facilitate comparisons (as
discussed earlier) and to facilitate statistical reasoning.
These data suggest that numerical representations of
likelihood signal certainty about the chances that an
outcome will occur and are appropriately used when
likelihood is known. Frequency representations (e.g., 1
out of 50) are preferred over other formats, because
they are easier to understand and they promote ac-
curate statistical reasoning. When the goal is only to
present likelihood, and no statistical reasoning is re-
quired, percent format (e.g., 2%) is also appropriate,
because it is perceived as easy to understand. Single-
event probabilities (expressed as a value between 0
and 1) present the greatest challenge to understanding
and, thus, should be avoided. Interpretation of likeli-
hood represented as frequency is subject to the bias
that higher numbers (e.g., higher incident counts) are
interpreted as representing greater probability, with-
out appropriate correction for the size of the group in
which the incidents are noted. Therefore, when mul-
tiple likelihoods are to be compared or combined, each
should be expressed as the number of occurrences in
a group of a standard size (e.g., 1 out of 100, 5 out of
100). This form of presentation (counts over a group
of standard size) is optimal for supporting the most
difficult probabilistic reasoning that consumers of
health information are likely to encounter: determin-
ing the predictive value of tests or symptoms.
Visual representation of likelihood
Visual representation of likelihood has the obvious ad-
vantage that visual information is salient [68] and rel-
atively easy to understand [69], suggesting that both
comprehension and recall of information about likeli-
hood could be improved with visual communication.
The discussion of numerical representations indicated
that frequency formats are preferred over probability
formats for numerical representations of probability.
Given this obvious advantage for frequency represen-
tations, this section will be limited to one type of vi-
sual representation: the representation of frequency in
the form of pictographs.
Frequency representations of likelihood include (as
discussed above for numerical formats) the number of
Evaluating risk and benefit information
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Figure 1
Pictograph representing a frequency of 3 out of 100
Figure 2
Pictograph showing partial figure. This pictograph represents a
frequency of 9 in 100
Figure 3
Likelihood of having a Down syndrome baby for a forty-year-old
woman
Each circle represents one forty-year-old woman carrying a baby. An empty
circle indicates that the baby does not have Down syndrome. A filled circle
indicates that the baby does have Down syndrome. This pictograph represents
a 1 in 100 chance of having a Down syndrome baby.
occurrences and the size of the group over which those
occurrences are counted. In a pictograph, each mem-
ber of the larger group is represented by a unique fig-
ure (e.g., a circle or an outline person), and the occur-
rences are shown by making a subset of the figures
different in some obvious way. Thus, a frequency of 3
in 100 can be visually represented by 100 figures, three
of which are visually distinct (Figure 1). This form of
representation results in better understanding among
both older and younger patients compared to verbal
presentations as either frequency (e.g., 1 in 5) or frac-
tional (e.g., 0.2 or 20%) probability [70, 71]. The only
drawback to pictographs is that they require more
space than equivalent numerical representations, par-
ticularly for very low likelihood events (e.g., 1 in
5,000), which require a large number of individual fig-
ures to represent likelihood.
There is some evidence that ‘‘partial’’ figures should
be avoided in frequency pictographs. Thus, for ex-
ample, to represent a frequency of 9 in 100, 10 figures
could be presented, with 1 figure nine-tenths shaded
(Figure 2). The evidence suggests that these partial fig-
ures are ‘‘rounded up,’’ so that the graphic would be
interpreted as representing 1 in 10, not 9 in 100 [72].
The resulting interpretation would be an inflation of
the actual likelihood.
As with numerical representations of frequency, the
absolute number of distinct figures influences the per-
ceived likelihood. Thus, for example, a frequency of 1
in 5 represented as one distinct figure among 5 will
be seen as less likely than the same frequency repre-
sented as 20 distinct figures in 100 [73]. For frequencies
that are to be compared, the lesson is both clear and
familiar (from the discussion above regarding numer-
ical frequencies): hold the size of the group constant
(e.g., 11 out of 100 compared to 5 out of 100, not 11
out of 100 compared to 1 out of 20).
These results indicate that pictographs are a good
way to present frequency information. See Figure 3 for
a pictographic representation showing the hypotheti-
cal client the likelihood that she is carrying a child
with Down syndrome. Information professionals
should, however, be aware, that in comparison to nu-
merical representations, pictographic representations
make risks more salient to decision makers. Frequency
pictographs should follow the principle articulated for
frequency representations in general: when multiple
frequencies are presented, each should be shown as a
number of incidents over a group of standard size. The
size of the large group should be chosen so that fre-
quencies can be represented without requiring partial
figures, because these tend to be rounded up to whole
numbers (e.g., 1.9 colored figures will be interpreted
as 2).
CONCLUSION
Research in cognitive psychology, reviewed in this pa-
per, leaves little doubt that the format of information
about risk and benefit influences understanding and
interpretation. Furthermore, based on this research, it
is possible to identify optimal representations for this
type of information. This paper offers an interdisci-
plinary bridge, so to speak, that brings these results
to the attention of information professionals, who can
then use them in the evaluation of consumer health
Burkell
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resources that address risk or benefit. The general
principles that emerge from this review of the litera-
ture are summarized below, providing succinct point-
ers for information professionals who want to identify
those consumer health resources addressing risk and
benefit that will most assist patrons in understanding
this complex information.
Recommendations for evaluating risk
communications
1. Verbal labels signal a vague or uncertain probabil-
ity. They should, therefore, be used only to describe
probabilities that are unknown or vague. One example
would be communication of the risk of a new virus in
the blood supply, where is it known that there is some
degree of risk, but the risk cannot be precisely speci-
fied.
2. The meaning of a verbal label changes with the out-
come being described, particularly if the outcomes
range from very low-probability events (e.g., being
struck by lightning) to higher-probability events (e.g.,
the chances of a thunderstorm occurring). As a result,
verbal labels should not be used to describe multiple
likelihoods in a single communication. For example,
for low-probability risks (e.g., miscarriage as a result
of amniocentesis), a 1% chance is labeled high, but
when verbal labels are used in a more general context
(e.g., to describe the likelihood of a false positive test
result), a 10% chance is considered a small possibility.
The interpretation of these two labels in a single com-
munication presents difficulty for the information con-
sumer and, thus, increases the likelihood of miscom-
munication and misunderstanding.
3. Numerical representations of probability are pref-
erable to verbal labels when likelihood can be precisely
specified. Thus, for example, discussions of the likeli-
hood of medication side effects should use numerical
representations of likelihood, because the chance of
these side effects occurring can be precisely specified
on the basis of clinical trial results.
4. When numerical representations are used for pre-
cisely known likelihoods, frequency format (e.g., 5
times out of 100) is most preferred, followed by per-
cent (e.g., 5%). Probability format (e.g., 0.05) should be
avoided, as this representation proves most difficult
for consumers to understand. Thus, when presenting
a known risk such as the chance of a 40-year-old wom-
an having a child with Down syndrome, it is best to
present the information as ‘‘the chances are 1 in 100
that you will have a baby with Down syndrome’’ (fre-
quency format), or ‘‘there is a 1% chance that you will
have a baby with Down syndrome’’ (percent format),
but not ‘‘there is a 0.01 likelihood that you will have
a baby with Down syndrome’’ (probability format).
5. When multiple risks are presented using frequency
format, the size of the comparison group should be
held constant (e.g., 1 in 100, 5 in 100, and 20 in 100
rather than 1 in 100, 1 in 20, and 2 in 10). When the
size of the comparison group is held constant, it is
easier to compare and combine different likelihoods.
6. Pictographs showing frequency representations of
likelihood tend to be the easiest format to understand.
The only drawback is that they take up a large amount
of space, particularly in comparison to numerical rep-
resentations and, thus, may be inappropriate when
there are many likelihoods to be communicated or
when presenting very low probability events (because
a frequency of, for example, 1 in 500 requires a picto-
graph of 500 figures, 1 of which is visually distinct).
7. In a pictograph, the overall number of figures pre-
sented should be chosen, so that occurrences in this
group can be shown as a number of whole figures, be-
cause partial figures tend to be rounded up in inter-
pretation of pictographs. Thus, it is better to show a
frequency of 9 in 100 as 9 distinct figures in a field of
100, rather than 1 figure that is 9/10 colored in a field
of 10 figures, because the second presentation will be
viewed as representing a frequency of 1 in 10, rather
than 9 in 100.
8. When multiple pictographs are used to present
risks or benefits in a single communication, each pic-
tograph should depict occurrences in a group of a
standard size (see point 5, above, for numerical fre-
quency presentations). Thus, to present the risks of
miscarriage separately for amniocentesis and chorionic
villus sampling, each risk should be depicted as 1 dis-
tinct figure in a field of 100.
When consumer health information regarding risk
and benefit is evaluated according to these guidelines,
information professionals can rest assured that they
have identified the best resources for their clients: re-
sources that capitalize on cognitive capabilities while
compensating for limitations.
REFERENCES
1. BAKER LM, MANBECK V. Consumer health information for
public librarians. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2002.
2. IBID.
3. RUDD RE, MOEYKENS BA, COLTON TC. Health and liter-
acy: a review of medical and public health literature. In:
Comings J, Garner B, Smith C, eds. The annual review of
adult learning and literacy. v.1. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass, 1999:158–99.
4. VAIANA ME, MCGLYNN EA. What cognitive science tells
us about the design of reports for consumers. Med Care Res
Rev 2002 Mar;59(1):3–35.
5. LIPKUS IM, HOLLANDS JG. The visual communication of
risk. J Natl Cancer Inst Monogr 1999;(25):149–63.
6. WILLIAMS MD, GISH KW, GIUSE NB, SATHE NA, CARRELL
DL. The Patient Informatics Consult Service (PICS): an ap-
proach for a patient-centered service. Bull Med Libr Assoc
2001 Apr;89(2):185–93.
7. NORMAN D. Things that make us smart: defending hu-
man attributes in the age of the machine. Reading, MA: Ad-
dison Wesley, 1993.
8. MAYO CLINIC. Breast cancer risk factors. [Web document].
Phoenix, AZ: Mayo Clinic, 2003. [rev. 4 Jun 2003; cited 27 Jun
2003]. ,http://www . mayoclinic . com / invoke . cfm?objectid5
B105D3F6-BFE9-4D89-A5E53914589F7E86&section54..
9. NEMOURS FOUNDATION. Should I worry about West Nile vi-
rus? [Web document]. Jacksonville, FL: Nemours Foundation,
2002. [rev. Aug 2002; cited 27 Jun 2003]. ,http://kidshealth
.org/teen/infections/bacterialpviral/westpnile.html..
10. GOYDER E, BARRATT A, IRWIG LM. Telling people about
Evaluating risk and benefit information
J Med Libr Assoc 92(2) April 2004 207
screening programmes and screening test results: how can
we do it better? J Med Screen 2000;7(3):123–6.
11. RYMER J, WILSON R, BALLARD K. Making decisions about
hormone replacement therapy. BMJ 2003 Feb 8;326(7384):
322–6.
12. STEGINGA SK, OCCHIPINTI S, GARDINER RA, YAXLEY J,
HEATHCOTE P. Making decisions about treatment for local-
ized prostate cancer. BJU International 2002 Feb;89(3):255–60.
13. CROYLE RT, LERMAN C. Risk communication in genetic
testing for cancer susceptibility. J Natl Cancer Inst Monogr
1999;(25):59–66.
14. BOGARDUS ST, HOLMBOE E, JEKEL JF. Perils, pitfalls, and
possibilities in talking about medical risk. JAMA 1999 Mar
17;281(11):1037–41.
15. BLACK WC, NEASE RG, TOSTESON AN. Perceptions of
breast cancer risk and screening effectiveness in women
younger than 50 years of age. J Natl Cancer Inst 1995 May
17;87(10):720–31.
16. SCHWARTZ LM, WOLOSHIN S, BLACK WC, WELCH HG.
The role of numeracy in understanding the benefit of screen-
ing mammography. Ann Intern Med 1997 Dec;127(11):966–
72.
17. WOLOSHIN S, SCHWARTZ LM, MONCUR M, GABRIEL S,
TOSTESON AN. Assessing values for health: numeracy mat-
ters. Med Decis Making 2001 Sep–Oct;21(5):382–90.
18. INTERNATIONAL ADULT LITERACY SURVEY. Literacy in the
information age: final report of the International Adult Lit-
eracy Survey. Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2000.
19. IBID.
20. LIPKUS IM, SAMSA G, RIMER BK. General performance
on a numeracy scale among highly educated samples. Med
Decis Making 2001 Jan–Feb;21(1):37–44.
21. KAHNEMAN D, TVERSKY A. Judgment under uncertainty:
heuristics and biases. Science 1974 Sep;185(4157):1124–31.
22. SEDLMEIER P. BasicBayes: a tutor system for simple
Bayesian inference. Behav Res Methods, Instrum Comput
1997 Aug;29(3):328–36.
23. SEDLMEIER P, GIGERENZER G. Teaching Bayesian reason-
ing in less than two hours. J Exp Psychol Gen 2001 Sep;
130(3):380–400.
24. WOLOSHIN S, SCHWARTZ LM. How can we help people
make sense of medical data? Eff Clin Pract 1999 Jul–Aug;
2(4):176–83.
25. SULLIVAN E. Consumer health: an online manual: health
literacy. [Web document]. Houston TX: National Network of
Libraries in Medicine: South Central Region, 2000. [rev. 26
Feb 2003; cited 27 Jun 2003]. ,http://nnlm.gov/scr/
conhlth/hlthlit.htm..
26. BRUN W, TEIGEN KH. Verbal probabilities: ambiguous,
context dependent or both? Organ Behav Hum Decis Process
1988 Jun;41(3):390–404.
27. KONG A, BARNETT GO, MOSTELLER F, YOUTZ C. How
medical professionals evaluate expressions of probability.
New Engl J Med 1986 Sep 18;315(12):740–4.
28. WALLSTEN TS, BUDESCU DV, ZWICK R, KEMP SM. Pref-
erences and reasons for communicating probabilistic infor-
mation in verbal or numerical terms. Bull Psychon Soc 1993
Mar;31(2):135–8.
29. CLARKE VA, RUFFIN CL, HILL DJ, BEAMEN AL. Ratings
of orally presented verbal expressions of probability by a
heterogeneous sample. J Appl Soc Psych 1992 Apr;22(8):638–
56.
30. WALLSTEN T, BUDESCU DV, RAPPAPORT A, ZWICK R, FOR-
SYTH B. Measuring the vague meanings of probability terms.
J Exp Psychol Gen 1986 Dec;115(4):348–65.
31. THEIL M. The role of translations of verbal into numerical
probability expressions in risk management: a meta-analysis.
J Risk Research 2002 Apr;5(2):177–86.
32. MAZUR DJ, MERZ JF. How age, outcome severity, and
scale influence general medicine clinic patients’ interpreta-
tions of verbal probability terms. J Gen Intern Med 1994
May;9(5):268–71.
33. OHNISHI M, FUKUI T, MATSUI K, HIRA K, SHINOZUKA M,
EZAKI H, OTAKI K, KUROKAWA W, IMURA H, KOYAMA H,
SHIMBO T. Interpretation and preference for probability ex-
pressions among Japanese patients and physicians. Fam
Pract 2002 Feb;19(1):7–11.
34. WALLSTEN TS, FILLENBAUM S, COX JA. Base rate effects
on the interpretations of probability and frequency expres-
sions. J Mem Lang 1986 Oct;25(5):571–87.
35. WOLOSHIN KK, RUFFIN MT, GORENFLO DW. Patients’ in-
terpretation of qualitative probability statements. Arch Fam
Med 1994 Nov;3(11):961–6.
36. OHNISHI, op. cit.
37. OLSON MJ, BUDESCU DV. Patterns of preference for nu-
merical and verbal probabilities. J Behav Decis Making 1997
Jun;10(2):117–31.
38. WALLSTEN, 1993, op. cit.
39. WALLSTEN, 1993, op. cit.
40. CALMAN KC. Cancer: science and society and the com-
munication of risk. BMJ 1996 Sep 28;313(7060):799–802.
41. TAVANA M, KENNEDY DT, MOHEBBI B. An applied study
using the analytic hierarchy process to translate common
verbal phrases to numerical probabilities. J Behav Decis
Making 1997 Jun;10(2):133–50.
42. IBID.
43. BIEHL M, HALPERN-FELSHER B. Adolescents’ and adults’
understanding of probability expressions. J Adolesc Health
2001 Jan;28(1):30–5.
44. CALMAN, op. cit.
45. EREV I, COHEN BL. Verbal versus numerical probabilities:
efficiency, biases, and the preference paradox. Organ Behav
Hum Decis Process 1990 Feb;45(1):1–18.
46. WALLSTEN T. The costs and benefits of vague informa-
tion. In: Hogarth RM, ed. Insights in decision making: a trib-
ute to Hillel J. Einhorn. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1990:28–43.
47. MSNBC NEWS. SARS risk on planes appears low. [Web
document]. MSN, 2003. [rev. Jun 2003; cited 7 Oct 2003].
,http://www.msnbc.com/news/922633.asp?cp151..
48. WALLSTEN, 1990, op. cit.
49. ELLSBERG D. Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. Q
J Econ 1961 Nov;75(4):643–69.
50. BRASE GL. Which statistical formats facilitate what de-
cisions? the perception and influence of different statistical
information formats. J Behav Decis Making 2002 Dec;15(5):
381–401.
51. BRASE GL, COSMIDES L, TOOBY J. Individuation, count-
ing, and statistical inference: the role of frequency and whole
object representations in judgment under uncertainty. J Exp
Psychol Gen 1998 Mar;127(1):1–19.
52. COSMIDES L, TOOBY J. Are humans good intuitive stat-
isticians after all? rethinking some conclusions from the lit-
erature on judgment under uncertainty. Cognition 1996 Jan;
58(1):187–276.
53. GIGERENZER G. Ecological intelligence: an adaptation for
frequencies. In: Cummins DD, Allen C, eds. The evolution of
mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998:9–29.
54. DENES-RAJ V, EPSTEIN S, COLE J. The generality of the
ratio-bias phenomenon. Pers and Soc Psychol Bull 1995 Oct;
21(10):1083–92.
55. YAMAGISHI I. When a 12.86% mortality is more danger-
Burkell
208 J Med Libr Assoc 92(2) April 2004
ous than 24.14%: implications for risk communication. Appl
Cogn Psychol 1997 Dec;11(6):495–506.
56. DENES-RAJ V, EPSTEIN S. Conflict between intuitive and
rational processing: when people behave against their better
judgment. J Pers Soc Psychol 1994 May;66(5):819–29.
57. KAHNEMAN, op. cit.
58. GRIMES DA, SNIVELY GR. Patients’ understanding of
medical risks: implications for genetic counseling. Obstet Gy-
necol 1999 Jun;93(6):910–4.
59. WOLOSHIN S, SCHWARTZ LM, BYRAM S, FISCHOFF B,
WELCH HG. A new scale for assessing perceptions of chance:
a validation study. Med Decis Making 2000 Jul–Sep;20(3):
298–307.
60. COSMIDES, op. cit.
61. GIGERENZER G, HOFFRAGE U. How to improve Bayesian
reasoning without instruction: frequency formats. Psychol
Rev 1995 Oct;102(4):684–704.
62. AARON E, SPIVEY-KNOWLTON M. Frequency vs. proba-
bility formats: framing the three doors problem. Proceedings
of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science
Society. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998:
13–8.
63. HOFFRAGE U, GIGERENZER G. Using natural frequencies
to improve diagnostic inferences. Acad Med 1998 May;73(5):
538–40.
64. GIGERENZER, 1998, op. cit.
65. HAMM RM, SMITH SL. The accuracy of patients’ judg-
ments of disease probability and test sensitivity and speci-
ficity. J Fam Pract 1998 Jul;47(1):44–52.
66. HOFFRAGE, 1998, op. cit.
67. GIGERENZER G. Adaptive thinking: rationality in the real
world. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000:62–8.
68. JARVENPAA SL. Graphic displays in decision making—
the visual salience effect. J Behav Decis Making 1990 Oct–
Dec;3(4):247–262.
69. WOLOSHIN, 2001, op. cit.
70. FULLER R, DUDLEY N, BLACKTOP J. Risk communication
and older people—understanding of probability and risk in-
formation by medical inpatients aged 75 years and older. Age
Ageing 2001 Nov;30(6):473–6.
71. FULLER R, DUDLEY N, BLACKTOP J. How informed is con-
sent? understanding of pictorial and verbal probability in-
formation by medical inpatients. Postgrad Med J 2002 Sep;
78(923):543–4.
72. SCHAPIRA MM, NATTINGER AB, MCHORNEY CA. Fre-
quency or probability? a qualitative study of risk commu-
nication formats used in health care. Med Decis Making.
2001 Nov–Dec;21(6):459–67.
73. RUDSKI J, VOLKSDORF J. Pictorial versus textual infor-
mation and the ratio-bias effect. Percept Mot Skills 2002 Oct;
95(2):547–54.
Received June 2003; accepted October 2003
